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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does a state administrative order issued under a coordinated
environmental enforcement scheme that both required the
state to consider water quality concerns and targeted the iden-
tical violations that the citizens sought to remedy preclude a
Clean Water Act citizen suit under the "diligent prosecution"
bars of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(A) and 1365(b)(1)(B)?
2. Does Rocky Mountain's doctrine of res judicata bar a Clean
Water Act citizen suit when the plaintiffs interest in protect-
ing natural resources has been represented by the state in a
prior enforcement action under its environmental statutes?
3. Does the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction under
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) when previously dumped mining over-
burden continues to discharge pollutants into a creek, the de-
fendant can remediate the violations, and intermittent
violations are likely in the future?
4. Does the fact that a mining company ceased dumping pollu-
tants in 1998 render a case moot when the company has
planned another phase of mining for the near future and
meaningful relief is available?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE**
Procedural History
This action is before the Court on appeal from an order of the
District Court for the District of Rocky Mountain granting Magma
Mining Company ("MMC") summary judgment in the citizen suit
brought against it by Friends of the Lustra ("FOL") under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(1994). The District Court held that Rocky Mountain's version of
res judicata precluded the suit and that section 309 of the CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994), barred the citizen suit because of the
state's diligent prosecution under a comparable state law. (R. 3-
4). In addition, the court ruled that the absence of a "continuing
violation" deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction under section
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994), the citizen suit provision of the CWA.
(Id.). Finally, the court held that the case was moot because MMC
had ceased dumping materials into Lustra Creek. (R. 4).
FOL has appealed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment on all four grounds. Rocky Mountain joins MMC in op-
posing FOL's appeal of the res judicata and citizen suit preclusion
holdings, arguing that its enforcement action was sufficient.
Rocky Mountain also joins FOL in appealing the District Court's
holding on the continuing violation and mootness issues.
Statement of the Facts
MMC operates an open pit opal mine on the slope of Magic
Mountain. (R. 4). In three phases between January 1980 and
January 1998, MMC stripped overburden rock from the slope to
reach the opal-bearing deposit and then dumped the overburden
in Lustra Creek. (Id.). As a result, the Creek now flows under-
ground for half a mile beneath the overburden. (Id.). MMC has
planned a fourth and final mining phase for the near future. (Id.).
Although MMC has not presently decided where to place the over-
burden it removes in phase four, dumping it in the Creek remains
the most cost-effective means of disposal. (Id.).
Rocky Mountain operates an environmental enforcement
scheme in which the state is required to implement two statutes,
the Rocky Mountain Solid Waste Act ("RMSWA") and the EPA-
approved Rocky Mountain Clean Water Act ("RMCWA"), in coordi-
** Editors Note: References to the Record may be found reprinted in Appendix A
of the Yale Law School Brief. The original page number of the Record has been
indicated within Appendix A of the Yale Brief by bracketed page numbers, e.g. [IL ni.
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nation with each other. (R. 7). In 1993, the Rocky Mountain De-
partment of Environmental and Natural Resources ("RMDENR")
commenced an administrative action against MMC by issuing a
notice of violation under the RMSWA for creating an unpermitted
landfill on top of Lustra Creek. (R. 4). In August 1994, RMDENR
and MMC agreed to a consent administrative order ("CAO") that
required MMC to cease all unpermitted dumping of overburden
immediately and to grade and plant the landfill with native vege-
tation so that it would be indistinguishable from the surrounding
area within three years. (Id.). As indicated in the CAO preamble,
RMDENR found that removal of the overburden "would result in
massive disruption of water quality by mud and silt erosion dur-
ing the removal process." (Id.)
Despite the fact that the RMSWA is the state's comprehensive
statutory scheme for regulating the disposal of solid waste (R. 5),
one of its purposes is also to protect water quality, and it must be
implemented in coordination with the RMCWA (R. 7). The RM-
SWA empowers Rocky Mountain to issue administrative compli-
ance orders, such as the CAO, and to bring a civil action in state
court for injunctive relief or for civil penalties of up to $2,500 per
violation. (R. 5). Although interested parties may intervene in a
state court action under the RMSWA, the statute provides no pub-
lic notice or participation for administrative actions. (R. 5).
MMC ceased overburden dumping in January 1998. (Id.). It
graded the landfill and planted native vegetation in 1998, but
scant rainfall has prevented any significant growth. (Id.) Studies
of Lustra Creek show more suspended solids below the mine than
above it, but the concentration has never exceeded that in other
streams in the area during the spring melt-off. (R. 5-6). FOL
properly filed a notice of intent to sue and later filed a complaint
under the CWA's citizen suit provision, alleging that MMC contin-
ues to violate section 301 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994),
and seeking both injunctive relief and civil penalties. (R. 3).
Rocky Mountain intervened to defend its administrative action as
well as to enforce its order against further illegal dumping by
MMC. (R. 4-5). The District Court granted MMC's motion for
summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rocky Mountain urges that the decision of the District Court
for the District of Rocky Mountain barring FOL's citizen suit be
upheld, because the prior state enforcement action under the RM-
[Vol. 19298
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SWA served as both a statutory bar under the CWA, and a doctri-
nal bar under res judicata. In order to enforce its order against
MMC, Rocky Mountain urges this Court to reverse the decision of
the District Court to grant MMC's motion for summary judgment
on the issues of continuing violation and mootness, because MMC
remains in violation of the CWA, future unpermitted dumping in
Lustra Creek is likely to recur, and meaningful relief is available.
Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) of the CWA precludes citizen suits
seeking civil penalties when "a state has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this
subsection." One of the primary goals of the RMSWA is the protec-
tion of water quality, and the statute is required to be imple-
mented in coordination with the EPA-approved RMCWA. The
CAO issued by Rocky Mountain under the RMSWA remedies the
same violations targeted by FOL's citizen suit, and the statute of-
fers a penalty assessment scheme comparable to section 309 of the
CWA. The coordinated enforcement scheme under the RMSWA,
and included in the CAO, adequately Zsafeguarded the citizens'
substantive interests, obviating the need for public notice, hear-
ing, and intervention. Since the primary enforcement responsibil-
ity of the CWA rests with the states, deference to the Rocky
Mountain's enforcement approach is proper.
Furthermore, Rocky Mountain is diligently prosecuting its en-
forcement action against MMC. The primary concern of the CAO
has been achieved, as MMC has placed no overburden in Lustra
Creek since 1998. Although the defendant has planted the area
with native vegetation, full realization of this objective has been
frustrated solely by a lack of rainfall. Rocky Mountain also seeks
to enforce its order against MMC in court to prevent any further
violations. When a state undertakes an enforcement action, dili-
gent prosecution is presumed, and deference to the agency's plan
of attack is particularly favored. Because citizen suits are meant
to supplement rather than supplant governmental action, section
309(g) should bar both the civil penalties and injunctive relief
sought by FOL.
The substantial identity between FOL and Rocky Mountain
in this case creates a privity relationship between the parties and
bars FOL's citizen suit under the doctrine of res judicata. Acting
in its parens patriae capacity to protect the sovereign interests of
the state, Rocky Mountain is presumed to represent the interests
of FOL and the rest of its citizens in addressing harm to the
state's natural resources. FOL was adequately represented in the
20011 299
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prior state enforcement action forbidding any further unpermitted
dumping in Lustra Creek, and thus is in privity with Rocky Moun-
tain for purposes of res judicata.
Furthermore, FOL's role as a private attorney general in
bringing a citizen suit under the CWA renders it substantially
identical to Rocky Mountain as a public enforcer of the law, mak-
ing a final judgment in the agency action a res judicata bar to this
suit. The primary goals of res judicata to conserve judicial re-
sources, to protect litigants from the expense and vexation attend-
ing multiple lawsuits, and to foster certainty, reliability, and
respect in the legal system by minimizing the possibility of incon-
sistent decisions can only be achieved by precluding FOL's action.
Although FOL's action is precluded, the District Court must
have subject matter jurisdiction over this case in order to allow
Rocky Mountain to enforce its CAO against MMC for ongoing vio-
lations of the CWA. Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the dis-
charge of pollutants from a point source into waters of the United
States, and mining waste constitutes a point source as water flows
through the waste and carries away pollutants. Since Lustra
Creek flows underneath the mining waste dumped by MMC for
half a mile, the presence of overburden in the Creek is a continu-
ing violation of the CWA. The fact that the harm to the environ-
ment caused by MMC's overburden is remediable also makes it a
continuing violation. In order to address the CWA's principle
goals of restoring the nation's waters and eliminating the dis-
charge of pollutants, the presence of overburden rock in Lustra
Creek should be considered a continuing violation of the Act.
Ongoing violations of the CWA also exist because there is a
continued likelihood of recurrence in intermittent or sporadic vio-
lations by the defendant. Not only has MMC failed to put effective
measures in place to ensure that future dumping of mining over-
burden into Lustra Creek will not occur, but they have already
violated the CAO. A fourth stage of mining has been planned by
MMC, requiring the removal of more overburden rock for which
MMC has yet to locate an alternative site. Given the continued
presence of overburden in Lustra Creek and the reasonable likeli-
hood of future overburden discharges into the Creek, MMC re-
mains in violation of the CWA.
Finally, MMC's actions since the issuance of the CAO by
Rocky Mountain cannot render this case moot. As a defendant as-
serting that its voluntary conduct moots a case, MMC has
presented no evidence to meet the formidable burden of making it
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absolutely clear that future unpermitted dumping in Lustra
Creek will not occur. On the contrary, Rocky Mountain has estab-
lished that MMC's dumping of overburden rock in the Creek is
likely to recur if injunctive relief is not granted. The fourth phase
of mining will require the removal of more overburden rock, and
since placing the overburden in Lustra Creek is the cheapest and
easiest means of disposal and MMC has no alternative plans for
the rock, there is a realistic prospect that the Creek will serve as
the disposal site. MMC has already violated the CAO with Rocky
Mountain and has made no assurances that it will not fill the
Creek again without a permit.
Mootness is improper when meaningful relief can be granted
in a suit. Since the court may grant an injunction to prevent any
further unpermitted dumping in Lustra Creek, meaningful relief
is available. There is a reasonable expectation that MMC will
place more overburden in the Creek, and the act of unpermitted
dumping is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its
completion, making this case "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." Eve& a temporary restraining order may not be available
before additional overburden is added to the Creek, given MMC's
remote location and the uncertainty surrounding the fourth phase
of mining. Holding this case to be moot would frustrate the pur-
pose of the CWA, RMSWA, and RMCWA to prohibit the unpermit-
ted discharge of pollutants and protect water quality.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER FOL'S CITIZEN
SUIT BECAUSE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
DILIGENTLY PROSECUTED MMC'S
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY
ISSUING A CONSENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
UNDER ITS COORDINATED ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT SCHEME.
The Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act") precludes citizen suits
seeking civil penalties when "a State has commenced and is dili-
gently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this
subsection ... ." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (1994). In 1994,
Rocky Mountain entered into a consent administrative order
("CAO") with Magma Mining Company ("MMC") regarding its
placement of mining overburden in Lustra Creek, and MMC
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ceased all overburden dumping in January 1998. (R. 4). In issu-
ing the CAO, the Rocky Mountain Department of Environment
and Natural Resources ("RMDENR") acted under the authority of
the state's Solid Waste Act ("RMSWA"), a statute that requires co-
ordinated implementation with the EPA-approved Rocky Moun-
tain Clean Water Act ("RMCWA"). (R. 4, 7). As a result of the
state's administrative action, section 309 of the CWA bars the citi-
zen suit brought by Friends of the Lustra ("FOL").
A. Deference to Rocky Mountain's choice of enforcement
mechanisms is proper, as the Clean Water Act
emphasizes states as the primary enforcers of the
Act.
From its enactment in 1972, the CWA has placed the primary
enforcement responsibility with the states. In its opening section,
the Act states that "[iut is the policy of the Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of the States to
prevent.., pollution...." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994) (emphasis
added). In addition to the plain language, both the structure and
legislative history of the Act support this emphasis. The Senate
Report noted Congress' intent for "the great volume of enforce-
ment actions [to] be brought by the State." S. REP. No. 92-414, at
64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730. Section 402
of the CWA allows EPA-approved state discharge programs to ad-
minister the Act, and states have the initial enforcement obliga-
tion under section 309. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(1), 1342(b)
(1994).
The Supreme Court has recognized the CWA's prioritization
of governmental action, particularly over citizen suits. See
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S.
49, 60-61 (1987) ("Gwaltney I"). Citizen suits, despite playing an
important role in the enforcement of the Act, are limited by the
fundamental principle that they "are meant to supplement rather
than supplant governmental action." Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
Such a principle is vital to preserve the "discretion of the state
enforcement authorities," and to maintaining the intended role of
the citizen as "interstitial" rather than "potentially intrusive." Id.
at 61. As a result, the Act bars citizen suits "to avoid subjecting
violators of the law to dual enforcement actions or penalties for
the same violation." S. REP. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985) (emphasis
added).
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The CWA's preference for state action over citizen suits is
most prevalent when the two enforcement actions simultaneously
address the same violation. If a state agency has already ad-
dressed the identical violation targeted by the citizen suit, "defer-
ence to the agency's plan of attack should be particularly favored."
North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Town of Scituate, 949
F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1991). In the present case, Rocky Moun-
tain has chosen to address MMC's overburden dumping through
its administrative process. Proper deference to the state's "plan of
attack" under the RMSWA is appropriate particularly because of
RMDENR's coordinated implementation of its environmental stat-
utory scheme. Here, the state has chosen its enforcement mecha-
nism from multiple applicable statutes. Both the mechanism and
the specific approach embodied in the CAO should be afforded
substantial latitude in order to achieve the CWA's stated goal of
preserving the primacy of state enforcement. See Comfort Lake
Ass'n v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 357 (8th Cir. 1998);
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICIAmericas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir.
1994); Williams Pipeline Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300,
1321 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
B. The coordinated implementation of Rocky Mountain's
environmental laws governing solid waste and
clean water constitutes an enforcement scheme
comparable to section 309(g) of the Clean
Water Act.
The section 309 bar to citizen suits is triggered when the state
takes enforcement action under a "State law comparable to [sec-
tion 309(g)]." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). The comparability re-
quirement does not mandate an identity of clauses between the
state act and section 309. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
965 F. Supp. 769, 793 (E.D. Va. 1997). Furthermore, at least one
court of appeals has prioritized deference to state enforcement
over the comparability analysis. See Comfort Lake Ass'n, 138 F.3d
at 357 (holding that the state's informal, but diligent, prosecution
barred a citizen suit under section 309). Properly deferring to
Rocky Mountain's choice of enforcement alternatives, the CAO is-
sued under the RMSWA is an administrative action pursuant to a
comparable state law.
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1. The overall statutory scheme remedies the same
violations targeted by the citizen suit.
As the CWA's bar of citizen suits is aimed at preventing dupli-
cative proceedings, the court's focus is properly placed "not on
state statutory construction, but on whether corrective action...
seeks to remedy the same violations as duplicative civilian ac-
tion." Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556. Courts have also empha-
sized whether the "overall state regulatory scheme" seeks to
address the violation in question. Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224
F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also ICI Americas, 29
F.3d at 381. In the present case, the CAO was promulgated spe-
cifically under the RMSWA. (R. 4). Although the primary focus of
this statute is solid waste and landfills, one of its guiding princi-
ples is the protection of water quality. (R. 5, 7). In addition,
RMDENR is required to coordinate implementation of RMSWA
with the EPA-approved RMCWA (R. 7), thus ensuring that
RMDENR's decision to issue the CAO incorporated the water pro-
tection objectives of the latter statute. Most importantly, the CAO
addressed the identical violations that are the subject of FOL's
suit: the dumping of overburden into Lustra Creek. (R. 1, 3). The
state evaluated its options under the total environmental enforce-
ment scheme and ultimately selected a remedy under RMSWA.
Not only are the injunctive and penalty remedies sought by FOL
duplicative, but the state's coordinated implementation approach
ensures that the organization's water quality concerns were con-
sidered in the issuance of the CAO.
2. RMSWA offers a penalty assessment scheme comparable
to section 309 of the Act.
Several courts have rejected the requirement that a state im-
pose a monetary penalty on the defendant in order for section
309(g) to bar a subsequent citizen suit. See, e.g., Town of Scituate,
949 F.2d at 555-56; N.Y Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. City
Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In
Town of Scituate, the court looked at the overall state statutory
scheme and found ample authorization for the assessment of civil
penalties. 949 F.2d at 556. Even though the state agency did not
enter an order under the specific section with a penalty assess-
ment provision, it was "enough that the overall scheme of the [fed-
eral and state] acts [was] aimed at correcting the same violations,
thereby achieving the same goals." Id. In the present case, Rocky
Mountain is authorized to assess a monetary penalty under RM-
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SWA but must proceed in state court in order to do so. While the
state chose to order MMC's compliance through administrative
means rather than court action, its overall penalty assessment
scheme is nonetheless comparable to section 309.
3. The CAO issued under Rocky Mountain's coordinated
enforcement scheme adequately safeguarded citizens'
substantive interests, thus obviating the need for
public notice, hearing, and intervention.
Although courts often look to the specific public notice and
participation requirements of a state statutory scheme, see, e.g.,
Save Our Bays and Beaches v. City and County of Honolulu, 904
F. Supp. 1098, 1133 (D. Haw. 1994); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1992), ("mandatory
public notice is not necessarily the sine qua non of comparabil-
ity,"); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F. Supp. 914, 918 (D. Or. 1993). The
purpose of this comparability inquiry is to determine whether the
state law in question adequately protects the substantive inter-
ests of concerned citizens. See Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556
n.7. If a court is satisfied that this fundamental safeguard exists,
the notice and participation rights are "satisfactorily comparable."
Id. In Town of Scituate, the First Circuit was satisfied that the
status of state administrative orders as public documents and the
opportunity both for intervention in a subsequent penalty action
and an individual hearing were adequate to safeguard citizens'
substantive interests. Id. In the present case, while perhaps only
the first of these notice and intervention opportunities was availa-
ble to FOL, the organization was hardly a model of diligent pollu-
tion monitoring. This citizen suit is FOL's first public complaint
regarding MMC's mining activities. (R. 5). Despite the RMSWA's
limited notice and intervention requirements, FOL's substantive
rights are nonetheless safeguarded by the dual statutory enforce-
ment scheme employed by Rocky Mountain. The coordinated en-
forcement scheme requires the state to consider the goals of the
RMCWA when enforcing the RMSWA (R. 7), ensuring that con-
cerns about water quality are fully weighed in any legal action.
2001] 305
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C. Rocky Mountain's issuance of a Consent
Administrative Order that successfully halted
MMC's dumping of overburden in Lustra Creek
surpasses the standard of diligent prosecution
required by the Clean Water Act.
When a state undertakes an enforcement action, diligent
prosecution is presumed, and the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing the state's efforts were not diligent. Williams Pipeline, 964 F.
Supp. at 1324 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 486-87 (D.S.C. 1995)) ("Laidlaw 1").
Here, too, a broad view of the enforcement scheme is appropriate
because "[t]he thrust of the CWA is to provide society with a rem-
edy against polluters in the interest of protecting the environ-
ment." Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
777 F. Supp. 173, 184 (D. Conn. 1991) ("Remington Arms F') (quot-
ing Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686
F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). Even if the state's chosen
remedy is less stringent than that desired in a citizen suit, such a
discrepancy cannot be read as a lack of diligence, but rather as a
reminder that plaintiffs are not entitled to a "personalized" rem-
edy. See id.
The majority of courts limit the finding of insufficient dili-
gence to situations where there is "persuasive evidence that the
state has engaged in a pattern of conduct in its prosecution...
that could be considered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad
faith." Remington Arms I, 777 F. Supp. at 183 (quoting Conn.
Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291,
1293 (D. Conn. 1986)). Conferring the proper latitude on states in
their choice of enforcement mechanisms inherently sets the dili-
gent prosecution standard so that it bars citizen suits except upon
a showing of extreme agency laxity or bad faith. See, e.g., Jones,
224 F.3d at 522-23 (holding that the state's "administrative en-
forcement action over a ten-year period" was not diligent);
Laidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. at 474-79 (state's extensive cooperation
with defendant to preclude citizen suit contributed to finding of no
diligent prosecution); N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F.
Supp. at 168 (during state's eight-year awareness of problem, it
"was acting as a pen pal, not a prosecutor").
In the present case, the CAO required both a cessation of
overburden dumping and the growth of native vegetation on the
existing overburden piles. The first, and primary, objective was
achieved in less than four years, while the second has been frus-
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trated by lack of rainfall. (R. 4). FOL seeks removal of the over-
burden covering Lustra Creek, yet the state declined this remedy
because it would be more injurious to the Creek at the present
time than maintaining the status quo. (Id.) Rocky Mountain also
seeks to enforce its order in court to prevent any further unper-
mitted dumping by MMC. (R. 5). As the primary enforcement
agent of the CWA, Rocky Mountain must have the necessary dis-
cretion to carry out its enforcement scheme, even if this means
achieving a result that does not match FOL's definition of success.
Slow progress in reaching total compliance with the CAO does not
mean the state's action was not diligent. See Williams Pipeline,
964 F. Supp. at 1325.
D. Section 309(g) bars both the civil penalties and
injunctive relief sought by FOL because an
incomplete bar would interfere with the state's
ability to enforce its environmental laws.
Although the Act appears to limit the section 309 bar to citi-
zen suits seeking civil penalties, see Coalition for a Liveable West
Side v. N.Y. City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 830 F. Supp. 194, 196-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), the Act's preference for governmental enforce-
ment over supplemental citizen action requires that suits for in-
junctive relief under section 505 also be precluded. First, the
Supreme Court has recognized the "connection between injunctive
relief and civil penalties" in the CWA citizen suit provision.
Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. at 58. Such a connection indicates that sec-
tion 309 bars not only civil penalties but also all other citizen suit
remedies. Second, allowing citizens to seek injunctive relief di-
rectly conflicts with the Supreme Court's admonition regarding
citizen suits as "potentially intrusive." Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. at 61.
Exposing defendants to possible litigation even after committing
to a CAO will greatly impair Rocky Mountain's efforts to negotiate
with polluters like MMC. See Comfort Lake Ass'n, 138 F.3d at
357. Furthermore, it defies the overall policy objective of avoiding
duplicative citizen suits and deferring to state enforcement
discretion.
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II. THE SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY BETWEEN FOL
AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN CREATES A PRIVITY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND BARS FOL'S CITIZEN SUIT UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment on the
merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the
same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153 (1979). This principle requires federal courts to give preclu-
sive effect to judgments entered by state courts of competent juris-
diction. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th
Cir. 1999); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1002
(9th Cir. 1980). Since res judicata applies to "orders of adminis-
trative agencies in the same manner as orders of courts," State v.
Williams, 118 R.M. 36, 39 (1999), and consent decrees entered by
courts, State v. Venessa, 94 R.M. 412, 417 (1975), the CAO be-
tween Rocky Mountain and MMC has res judicata effect. Friends
of the Lustra v. Rocky Mountain, Civ. No. 00-1436 (D.R.M. 2000).
In Williams, the Rocky Mountain Supreme Court adopted a
four-part test for res judicata requiring "(1) [ildentity of the thing
sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the per-
sons and parties to the actions; and (4) identity of the quality of
the persons for or against whom the claim is made." 118 R.M. at
39 (quoting Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo.
1966)). The only dispute in this case is whether the plaintiff par-
ties are identical. Although FOL is a different entity than Rocky
Mountain, parties are considered identical for res judicata pur-
poses if they are in privity. Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 903;
United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1197 (8th Cir. 1994). The
doctrine of privity extends the conclusive effect of a judgment to
nonparties who are in privity with parties to an earlier action.
ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1003.
The Supreme Court has characterized the privity relationship
as one of "substantial identity" between parties. Montana, 440
U.S. at 153; see also Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1197 (finding that privity
exists when two parties to two separate suits have a "close rela-
tionship bordering on near identity"). Privity is not dependant
upon the subjective interests of the individual parties, but instead
represents a legal conclusion that the relationship between the
party of record and the non-party is "sufficiently close" to afford
application of the principle of preclusion. Harmon Indus., 191
F.3d at 903 (holding that EPA and a state are in privity under the
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CWA regarding EPA enforcement of permits issued by the state
pursuant to programs approved by EPA); Southwest Airlines Co.
v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977). The
substantial identity between Rocky Mountain and FOL, based on
Rocky Mountain's parens patriae capacity to represent the inter-
ests of its citizens, and FOL's role as a private attorney general in
bringing a citizen suit, establishes a privity relationship and bars
FOL's action under the doctrine of res judicata.
A. Acting in its parens patriae capacity to protect the
sovereign interests of the state, Rocky Mountain
represents the interests of FOL and establishes a
privity relationship between the parties.
Among the relationships that federal courts have found "suffi-
ciently close" to justify preclusion by -es judicata are those where
the interests of the non-party were adequately represented by an-
other party in a prior action. Southwest Airlines, 546 F.2d at 95.
Under the parens patriae doctrine, a state that is a party to a suit
involving a matter of sovereign interest is presumed to represent
the interests of all its citizens. See New Jersey v. New York, 345
U.S. 369, 372 (1953); Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp.,
34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994); Envtl. Def Fund v. Higginson,
631 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This principle is a necessary
recognition of sovereign dignity and a working rule for good judi-
cial administration. Without it, a state might be judicially im-
peached on matters of policy by its own citizens, and there would
be no practical limit on the number of plaintiffs entitled to be
made parties. New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 372.
Traditional parens patriae lawsuits have involved "a govern-
ment suing to enjoin alleged nuisances caused by water or air pol-
lution." United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D.
Ala. 1985). In Alaska Sport Fishing, a group of sportfishers
sought injunctive relief and monetary damages from the defen-
dant "to provide for an environmental mitigation and monitoring
fund" in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 34 F.3d at
771. The complaint asserted a variety of causes of action, includ-
ing violation of a state statute imposing strict liability for release
of hazardous substances. Id. Almost two years after the action
was filed, the United States and the state of Alaska filed suit
against Exxon in their capacity as "trustees for the public" and
entered into a settlement agreement and consent decree requiring
defendants to pay at least $900 million in natural resource and
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other damages. Id. The court recognized the principle that state
governments may act in their "parens patriae capacity as repre-
sentatives for all their citizens in a suit to recover damages for
injury to a sovereign interest," including harm to natural re-
sources within its boundaries. Id. at 773 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp
& Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982));
see also Menzel v. County Utilities Corp., 501 F. Supp. 354, 357
(E.D. Va. 1979) (finding the discharge of pollutants into state wa-
ters to be a "sovereign interest" under the doctrine of parens pa-
triae). The sportfishers, as members of the public, were held to be
"parties" to the prior suit and were thus precluded by res judicata.
Alaska Sport Fishing, 34 F.3d at 773; see also Olin Corp., 606 F.
Supp. at 1304 (holding that "once a state represents its citizens in
a parens patriae suit, a consent decree or final judgment entered
in such a suit is conclusive upon those citizens and is binding upon
their rights").
1. The interests of FOL in protecting the natural resources
of the state were adequately represented by Rocky
Mountain in the state enforcement action against
MMC.
Although the specific enforcement measures sought by FOL
and Rocky Mountain differ somewhat, the overarching objective of
both parties is to address damage to the state's natural resources
resulting from MMC's dumping of overburden rock into Lustra
Creek. See Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 778
(9th Cir. 1994). FOL brought suit under section 505 of the CWA,
alleging that MMC violated section 301 of the Act by dumping
overburden into Lustra Creek and allowing those pollutants to re-
main in the Creek without a permit. (R. 3). Although it did not
take the action currently sought by FOL, Rocky Mountain has
previously addressed the discharges by considering the overbur-
den pile on top of Lustra Creek to constitute an unpermitted land-
fill and issuing a notice of violation against MMC under the
RMSWA. (R. 4). FOL also seeks injunctive relief to forbid MMC
from discharging more pollutants into the Creek and to require
the company to remove the overburden it has already placed
there. (R. 3). However, the state has already issued a CAO under
the RMSWA, requiring MMC to cease dumping in the Creek with-
out a permit, and has found that removal of overburden from the
Creek would result "in a massive disruption of water quality." (R.
4). In taking action under the RMSWA, Rocky Mountain acted in
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its parens patriae capacity as trustee of the state's natural re-
sources on behalf of FOL and the rest of the public. See Alaska
Sport Fishing, 34 F.3d at 773. FOL has failed to show that its
interest is different and will not be represented by Rocky Moun-
tain in the state's enforcement action. See Higginson, 631 F.2d at
740.
2. Since FOL was adequately represented in the prior
enforcement action by Rocky Mountain, the parties
are in privity for purposes of res judicata and
FOL's suit should be precluded.
Where the State is a party to relevant proceedings, its citizens
are represented in those proceedings and are bound by the judg-
ment. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 692-93 n.32 (1979), modified
on other grounds 444 U.S. 816 (1979); Eyak Native Village, 25
F.3d at 777 (holding that citizens represented by the plaintiff
seeking to protect area from environmental harm, after state
reached consent decree with defendant, were "more than in privity
with the State; they were identical"); EPA v. City of Green Forest,
921 F.2d 1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that intervening
citizen's CWA action was precluded by consent decree entered into
by EPA and defendant); United States v. Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd.,
584 F.2d 1273, 1276 n.15 (3rd Cir. 1978) (earlier state administra-
tive determination under NPDES has res judicata effect in federal
court action). There is an express or implied legal relationship by
which the state in the first suit is accountable to its citizens who
file a subsequent suit with identical issues. See ITT Rayonier, 627
F.2d at 1003.
Acting in its parens patriae capacity, Rocky Mountain has the
legal right to represent the interests of its citizens in taking en-
forcement action against MMC to prevent further degradation of
Lustra Creek. The persons for whose benefit and at whose discre-
tion a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be "strangers to
the cause ... One who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of
another to establish and protect his own right . ..is as much
bound .. .as he would be if he had been a party to the record."
Montana, 440 U.S. at 154 (quoting Souffront v. La Compagnie des
Sucreries de Porto Rico, 217 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1910)); see also ITT
Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1002 ("[W~e do not believe [the CWA]
manifests countervailing policy reasons to abrogate the doctrine
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known generically as res judicata."). Section 41 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments provides:
(1) A person who is not a party to an action but who is repre-
sented by a party is bound and entitled to the benefits of the
rules of res judicata as though he were party. A person is repre-
sented by a party who is:
. . . (d) An official or agency invested by law with authority to
represent the person's interests;
(2) A person represented by a party to an action is bound by the
judgment even though the person himself does not have notice
of the action, is not served with process, or is not subject to ser-
vice of process.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded). Since the interests of FOL have already been represented by
Rocky Mountain's enforcement action, the parties are substan-
tially identical and in privity for purposes of res judicata, and FOL
is precluded from bringing a citizen suit against MMC.
B. The substantial identity between FOL in its role as a
private attorney general and Rocky Mountain as a
public enforcer of the law is sufficient to
establish privity between the parties.
Citizens seeking to enforce CWA regulations under citizen
suit provisions are not suing on their own behalf for damages done
to them but as "private attorneys general," vindicating the public's
interest. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
890 F.2d 690, 695 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Gwaltney 11"). Acting as a pri-
vate attorney general of the state, FOL alleges violations of the
CWA and seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties against MMC
for the discharge of mining overburden into Lustra Creek. (R. 3).
However, the state itself has already undertaken its own public
enforcement action against MMC to address the discharge of min-
ing overburden, choosing instead to find violations and issue a
CAO under the RMSWA. (R. 4). Furthermore, the civil penalty
sought by FOL under section 505(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(1994), will go to the United States Treasury and not to the plain-
tiff, as in a private claim for damages. In its role as a private at-
torney general, FOL is substantially identical to Rocky Mountain,
establishing a privity relationship and barring FOL's action by res
judicata. See ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1003; Southwest Airlines,
546 F.2d at 98.
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As discussed in Part I.A., the express intent of Congress
under the CWA was "to recognize, preserve, and protect the pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of the states to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (emphasis added).
The principles of res judicata are promoted in the CWA, as the
right to maintain a citizen suit is limited and may not be brought
if appropriate state regulatory agencies have undertaken their
own enforcement action to correct a violation. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319(g)(6), 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994). Since " '[tihe great volume of
enforcement actions are intended to be brought by the State,"' citi-
zens may only act as private attorneys general "'if the Federal,
State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement respon-
sibility."' S. REP. No. 92-414, at 64). Since Rocky Mountain "has
specifically addressed the concerns of an analogous citizen's suit,
deference to the agency's plan of attack should be particularly fa-
vored." Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557; see also County of West-
chester, 686 F. Supp. at 1052 (finding that "as representative of
society as a whole," the government is usually "in the best position
to vindicate societal rights and interests"). As a result, final judg-
ment in the agency's action will serve as a res judicata bar to the
citizen suit. Comfort Lake Ass'n, 138 F.3d at 356; see also City of
Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1402-05.
C. Precluding FOL's citizen suit against MMC serves the
primary goals of res judicata.
Res judicata is designed to conserve judicial resources, protect
litigants from the expense and vexation attending multiple law-
suits, and foster certainty, reliance, and respect in the legal sys-
tem by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; see also Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. 110, 129 n.10 (1983) ("The policies advanced by the doc-
trine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases concern-
ing real property, land and water."). It also supports several
private interests, including protection from harassment or coer-
cion by lawsuits and avoidance of conflicting rights and duties
from inconsistent judgments. Southwest Airlines, 546 F.2d at 94.
Res judicata is a rule of "fundamental and substantial justice, of
public policy and of private peace, and should be cordially re-
garded and enforced by the courts." Federated Dep't Stores v. Moi-
tie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981).
Allowing FOL's citizen suit to proceed would defeat these fun-
damental principles of res judicata. First, it would add uncer-
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tainty to the actions that MMC must take in order to comply with
the law. If FOL succeeds, the decision will be inconsistent with
the CAO between MMC and Rocky Mountain. In addition, reli-
ance and respect in the legal system would be lost if Rocky Moun-
tain's CAO is questioned and undermined in a subsequent court
action. A citizen suit by FOL would also be a waste of judicial
resources, as a CAO is already in place to address the dumping of
overburden rock into Lustra Creek. Finally, MMC will suffer the
harassment and expense of another court action and of attempted
compliance with inconsistent judgments. For these reasons, the
District Court was correct in holding that the state's version of res
judicata applied to bar FOL's citizen suit because FOL was in
privity with Rocky Mountain.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 505(A)(1)
OF THE CWA BECAUSE MMC REMAINS IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 301(A) DUE
BOTH TO THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF
OVERBURDEN IN LUSTRA CREEK AND MMC'S
FAILURE TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE
DISCHARGES WILL NOT OCCUR.
For a court to assert subject matter jurisdiction under section
505(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), a party must demonstrate
that MMC remains "in violation" of the Act through its "unlawful"
"discharge of any pollutant" into "the waters of the United States."
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), 1365(a) (1994). A showing of viola-
tion can be made "either (1) by proving violations that continue on
or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likeli-
hood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations." Ches-
apeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170,
171-72 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Gwaltney III"); see also Carr v. Alta Verde
indus., 931 F.2d 1055, 1063 (5th Cir. 1991); Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988). The ability to remedi-
ate the cause of pollution must also be considered a substantial
factor in determining whether or not a polluter remains in viola-
tion. Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. at 69. As the record indicates, MMC
remains in violation of the CWA on a continuing basis due to the
current discharges of pollutants from the mining overburden pile
in Lustra Creek. In addition, MMC is violating the Act on an in-
termittent basis, because the operations that led to the initial dis-
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posal of overburden in Lustra Creek have not been altered so as to
eliminate the likelihood of further dumping.
A. The presence of overburden in Lustra Creek
constitutes a continuing violation of section 301(a)
of the CWA.
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants, including
rock, sand, and industrial wastes, from a point source into waters
of the United States without, or in violation of, a permit. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(6), 1362(12) (1994). MMC's overburden
pile is a point source for the continual unpermitted discharge of
rock, sand, and industrial waste into Lustra Creek. MMC does
not dispute evidence that the pile continues to discharge pollu-
tants into the Creek. Studies have shown both that the concentra-
tion of suspended solids in the stream remains greater upstream
than downstream and that the concentration below the pile year-
round is matched by other nearby streams only during the heavy
flows of the spring snow melt-off. (R. 4-5). Applying the Gwaltney
I standard illustrates the continuing nature of MMC's violation,
as the overburden remains a remediable threat to the overall eco-
logical health of the Lustra and the waterways into which it flows.
See 484 U.S. at 69. Failure to recognize the overburden's presence
in Lustra Creek as a continuing violation would contravene not
only established case law but also the intent of Congress.
1. Mining refuse is a point source from which any water
flow constitutes a discharge.
In citizen suits alleging violation of section 301(a) of the CWA,
courts have recognized that solid mining wastes pose a continuing
threat to water quality and the aquatic environment. The District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington held that former tail-
ing ponds, now filled with soil, remained point sources for the dis-
charge of pollutants into nearby waters: "[E]ven though runoff
may be caused by rainfall or snow melt percolating through a
pond or refuse pile, the discharge is from a point source because
the pond or refuse pile acts to collect and channel contaminated
water." Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co.,
870 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Wash. 1994). Another district court
has held that water flowing from mine shafts and pits, where min-
ing wastes remained, into several Montana creeks constituted the
addition of pollutants to navigable waters. Beartooth Alliance v.
Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (D. Mont. 1995); see
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also Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that "mining activities [that] release pollutants through a
confined, discernable conveyance" are point sources). In both dis-
trict court cases, the courts found a continuing violation because
discharges continued to occur due to the regular flow of water
through mining wastes. In neither case did the plaintiffs claim
that the defendants were willfully discharging pollutants from
their properties. See Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. at 1173;
Hecla Mining, 870 F. Supp. at 988. Although MMC has presently
ceased polluting Lustra Creek through the direct addition of over-
burden (R. 4), MMC remains in violation because the overburden
continues to discharge pollutants into the water.
2. The overburden in Lustra Creek remains a remediable
problem and thus a continuing violation under the
Gwaltney I standard.
In ruling that the continued presence of overburden does not
constitute a continuing violation, the District Court failed to ad-
dress the remediable nature of MMC's offense. In Gwaltney I, the
Court recognized that violations continue until such time as the
cause of the violation is remediated. 484 U.S. at 69. In the classic
case of water pollution, an industrial plant discharges liquid
wastes into a body of water. Once the plant ceases releasing
wastes into the water, its previous discharges are rendered wholly
past, not only because the discharge of pollutants has come to an
end but also because the previous discharges have so thoroughly
intermixed with the water or sediment as to be unremediable.
The present case, however, does not fit the mold of such a "classic"
CWA violation. Here, the discharge of solid waste into the water
has created a point source from which discharges will continue as
long as the overburden remains in the streambed. In fact, the
overburden more closely resembles wetlands fill violations speci-
fied in section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994), or solid
waste violations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1994), both of which have
been found to constitute continuing violations based upon the con-
tinued presence of pollutants. See, e.g., Informed Citizens United
v. USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (applying
section 404 of the Act); Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp.
1037, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying RCRA). While the
RMDENR has noted that significant erosion would occur during
the overburden removal process (R. 4), the record is silent as to
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long-term health of the Lustra Creek, which might be improved
through remediation of the overburden.
a. The overburden in Lustra Creek is comparable in
effect to wetlands fill, the presence of which has
been held to be a continuing and remediable
violation of section 404 of the CWA.
A number of courts have had the opportunity to review cases
of wetlands fill following the Supreme Court's decision in
Gwaltney I, and have determined that a violation continues until
the effects of the fill are remediated. Although mining overburden
does not fall within the statutory definition of "fill" under the Act,
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2000) (defining "fill" as "any material used
for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land
or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody"), the presence
of overburden in Lustra Creek is analogous in its effects to that of
fill in wetlands. In both situations, a quantity of soil and rock pol-
lutes the ecosystem, in the present case forcing Lustra Creek into
subterranean exile for more than half a mile. (R. at 4). In a citi-
zen suit brought against USX over the filling of wetlands, the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas held that it had
jurisdiction, because "a violation is 'continuing' for purposes of the
statute until illegally dumped fill material has been removed."
USX Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 377; see also N.C. Wildlife Fed'n v.
Woodbury, No. 87-584-CIV-5, 1989 WL 106517, at *3 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 25, 1989). The Fourth Circuit has also held, in a wetlands fill
case, that "[each day the pollutant remains in the wetlands with-
out a permit constitutes an additional day of violation." Sasser v.
EPA, 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.
Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 700 (D.N.J. 1987)). In both USX and
Sasser, the defendants had ceased active filling operations prior to
the filing of the plaintiffs' claims. See USX, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 376;
Sasser, 990 F.2d at 129. However, the courts noted not only that
the actual discharge of fill materials into wetlands constituted a
violation but also that the presence of the fill materials was a con-
tinuing violation until its removal. In the present case, the Dis-
trict Court's exclusive focus on the act of dumping ignores the
continuing effects of the overburden as well as MMC's ability to
remediate it through removal.
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b. The overburden in Lustra Creek is analogous to the
ongoing presence of solid waste, which is a
continuing violation under RCRA.
Solid waste claims are strongly analogous to the situation
presented by the mining overburden in Lustra Creek, especially
considering the application of the Gwaltney I "continuing viola-
tion" standard by courts deciding RCRA citizen suit claims. See
Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d
1305, 1311 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Remington Arms I'); Aurora Nat'l
Bank v. Tri-Star Marketing, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); Gache, 813 F. Supp. at 1041. The District Court in the
present case did correctly observe that the statutory language of
RCRA provides for greater latitude in the citizen prosecution of
past acts of dumping than does the CWA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(1994) (providing for citizen suits where defendant is "alleged to be
in violation" in the district "in which the alleged violation oc-
curred" (emphasis added)); Gache, 813 F. Supp. at 1041. However,
the Gache court emphasized the logical inconsistency of a finding
that the continued presence of polluting materials does not consti-
tute a continuing present violation:
The environmental harms do not stem from the act of dumping
when waste materials slide off the dump truck but rather after
they land and begin to seep into the ground, contaminating the
soil and water. So long as wastes remain in the landfill threat-
ening to leach into the surrounding soil and water, a continuing
violation surely may exist.
813 F. Supp. at 1041; see also Aurora Nat'l Bank, 990 F. Supp. at
1025; City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 833 F.
Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993). As with the section 404 deci-
sions on wetlands fill, these RCRA cases conclude that, where a
pollutant's threat to the environment is remediable, its presence is
a continuing violation of statutory requirements.
3. The continuing presence of overburden in Lustra Creek
violates the basic purposes of the Clean Water Act.
Congress passed the CWA expressly "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). To achieve these goals, Con-
gress mandated the elimination of all non-permitted discharges of
pollutants into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). Rules of
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statutory construction indicate that, where clear, the plain mean-
ing of a statute carries the most "weight" in its interpretation.
Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (1941); see also Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700 (1980).
A number of courts, including the District Court in this case,
however, have ignored the broader purposes of the Act, as ex-
pressed in plain language by Congress. These courts have stated
that holding a continued presence of pollutant materials to equal
a continuing violation would effectively eviscerate Gwaltney I and
would permit citizens to sue for wholly past violations. Remington
Arms 1!, 989 F.2d at 1313; see also Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 969, 975 (D. Wyo. 1998); Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1354 (D.N.M. 1995). In
fact, the LAC Minerals court faced a fact situation quite similar to
the present case and held that the presence of mining overburden
in an arroyo did not constitute a point source for the discharge of
pollutants in continuing violation of the CWA. 892 F. Supp. at
1354. Contra Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. at 1172; Hecla
Mining Corp., 870 F. Supp. at 988. In each of these cases, though,
the courts failed to address the substantial difference between re-
mediable and non-remediable violations, a concept central both to
the holding in Gwaltney I and to the CWA's overall goals of resto-
ration of the Nation's waters and elimination of the discharge of
pollutants. 484 U.S. at 69; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). While these
courts attempted to follow Gwaltney I on the issue of continuing
violation, they were actually unfaithful to the Supreme Court's
language finding that a remediable discharge is a continuing vio-
lation. In doing so, these courts not only contravened the
Gwaltney holding itself but ignored the fundamental purposes of
the CWA as well.
B. MMC has failed to ensure that future discharges of
overburden will not occur.
MMC also remains out of compliance due to intermittent vio-
lations of the CWA. As noted previously, the Fourth Circuit held
that "a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or
sporadic violations" renders a polluter in violation. Gwaltney III,
844 F.2d at 171-72. "Intermittent or sporadic violations do not
cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no real likelihood
of repetition." Id. In finding that a defendant remains in violation
due to a reasonable likelihood of intermittent discharges, courts
have focused upon the methods used by the defendants to control
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discharges and whether such methods have "completely eradi-
cated" the risk of future violations at the time of the citizen suit's
filing. Id. In Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai),
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1401 (D. Haw. 1995), the court held that a
construction company remained in violation as long as the possi-
bility existed for silt and dirt to runoff from their earthworks into
neighboring waters. See also Carr, 931 F.2d at 1060 (finding that
the capacity of a feedlot runoff holding pond would be unable to
prevent overflow during average heavy rains); Gwaltney 11, 890
F.2d at 694-95 (finding that an anaerobic lagoon and other mea-
sures were insufficient to prevent TKN (total Kjeldahl nitrogen)
violations during winter); Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. Coun-
try Place Waste Treatment Facility, 769 F. Supp. 739, 745-46
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (finding the method for treating waste water in-
sufficient to deal with climate fluctuations); Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co., 716 F. Supp. 429, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding storm ba-
sins to be of inadequate capacity to prevent discharges during
heavy rains).
MMC, like the defendants in the above cases, has failed to put
into place effective measures to ensure that future dumping of
mining overburden into Lustra Creek will not occur. MMC has
already proven its inability to comply with the CAO issued by
RMDENR. In fact, its feeble attempts to comply with the agree-
ment only began in 1998, more than three years after issuance of
the CAO and a year after the date by which the proposed mea-
sures were to have been completed. (R. 4). While the district
court failed to consider the possibility of intermittent violations by
MMC, the record provides ample evidence that a strong likelihood
of future violations by MMC remains. MMC has already indicated
that it has planned a fourth phase of mining excavations and cur-
rently has found no other site for disposal of the overburden ex-
cept Lustra Creek. (Id.) In fact, the record shows that
"[p1lacement of overburden in the Creek bed is the easiest and
cheapest means of disposing of the overburden for MMC," even
though the illegality of such disposal has already been determined
through administrative action by Rocky Mountain. (Id.)
Although MMC indicates that the fourth phase will not com-
mence for at least a year, the interval between likely violations
cannot relieve MMC of current liability, since "there is no statu-
tory exemption for de minimis or 'rare' violations." Natural Res.
Def. Council v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 815
(N.D. Ill. 1988). There is no evidence to indicate that the policies,
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procedures, and mechanisms used during previous phases of the
mine to manage disposal of overburden have even been reconsid-
ered let alone amended or replaced. In short, MMC is in intermit-
tent violation of the CWA because of the reasonable likelihood of
future overburden discharges into Lustra Creek.
IV. THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER
UNPERMITTED DUMPING OF OVERBURDEN
IN LUSTRA CREEK AND THE
AVAILABILITY OF MEANINGFUL RELIEF
PREVENT A FINDING OF MOOTNESS.
The doctrine that federal courts may not decide moot cases
"derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution
under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the exis-
tence of a case or controversy." Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301,
306 n.3 (1964). If the violation at issue has ceased and there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated, long-
standing principles of mootness prevent the maintenance of a suit.
Gwaltney I, 484 U.S. at 66. However, a claim is not moot if it can
be shown that the court can "theoretically grant" relief. Vieux
Carre Property Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1446 (5th Cir.
1991). Since the dumping of overburden into Lustra Creek is
likely to recur, and meaningful relief can be granted by this Court,
the case should not be rendered moot.
A. MMC has failed to show that it is absolutely clear
that future unpermitted dumping of overburden in
Lustra Creek will not occur.
It is well settled that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice. If it did, the courts would
be compelled to leave the defendant ... free to return to his old
ways." Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
120 S. Ct. 693, 708 (2000) ("Laidlaw I"). The Supreme Court has
set out a "stringent" standard for determining whether a case has
been mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct: "A case might
become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
to recur." Laidlaw 11, 120 S. Ct. at 698 (quoting United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
Thus, a defendant claiming that its voluntary conduct moots a
case bears the "formidable burden" of making it "absolutely clear"
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that such behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.
Laidlaw 11, 120 S. Ct. at 698-99.
In the court below, MMC claimed that its "voluntary" conduct
rendered the violation moot, yet offered no supporting evidence
other than stating that it has no intention of ever placing rock in
Lustra Creek in the future. (R. 9). This statement is clearly insuf-
ficient to meet the formidable burden the Supreme Court has
placed on a defendant attempting to establish a mootness claim
resulting from defendant's voluntary conduct. See Concentrated
Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. at 203 (holding that defendant's
own statement that it would be uneconomical for them to engage
in further operations "cannot suffice to satisfy the heavy burden of
persuasion which we have held rests upon those in defendants'
shoes"). A fourth phase of mining has been planned by the defen-
dant, which will require the removal of more overburden from
Magic Mountain. (R. 4). MMC has not decided where to place the
rock that it removes, and placement of overburden in the Creek
remains the cheapest and easiest means of disposal. (Id.) Since
MMC has not made it "absolutely clear" that no further unpermit-
ted dumping will occur in Lustra Creek, this case is not moot. See
Laidlaw H, 120 S. Ct. at 710-11 (finding that defendant's substan-
tial compliance with permit requirements and closure of the facil-
ity at issue did not automatically moot plaintiffs claim, as
defendant had not made it absolutely clear that permit violations
could not reasonably be expected to recur).
B. MMC's unpermitted dumping of overburden into
Lustra Creek is likely to recur if injunctive relief is
not granted.
A different standard for mootness applies, however, when the
defendant has not voluntarily ceased its allegedly wrongful behav-
ior. In a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is the plaintiffs
burden to establish that, "if unchecked by the litigation, the defen-
dant's allegedly wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue,
and that the 'threatened injury is certainly impending."' Laidlaw
II, 120 S. Ct. at 699. When action is taken under the threat of
enforcement activities, plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is moot
unless it proves that "there is a realistic prospect that the viola-
tions alleged in [its] complaint will continue notwithstanding" the
CAO between MMC and Rocky Mountain. See Comfort Lake
Ass'n, 138 F.3d at 355; Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991).
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In the present case, Rocky Mountain has presented evidence
sufficient to meet this burden. MMC has plans for a fourth phase
of mining in the near future that will require the removal of more
overburden rock from Magic Mountain. (R. 4). Placement of over-
burden in Lustra Creek remains the easiest and cheapest means
of disposal, creating a "realistic prospect" that the Creek will be
the final resting place for the rock. Furthermore, MMC has al-
ready violated the CAO by failing to nurture vegetation on the
landfill so that it would be indistinguishable from vegetation on
adjacent areas within the designated time period. (R. 4). Rocky
Mountain seeks to enforce its order against MMC to prevent any
further unpermitted dumping, which is likely to occur shortly if
the court does not intervene.
C. Mootness is improper when meaningful relief can be
granted in a suit.
It is undisputed that a request for injunctive relief may be
moot when the event sought to be enjoined has occurred, Harris v.
City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1989), or even when a
substantial portion of the project is completed. See Fla. Wildlife
Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 611 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1980). In such
cases, there is no meaningful relief that a court could grant to sat-
isfy plaintiffs' concerns. See Bayou Liberty Ass'n v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 217 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2000); Am. Riv-
ers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that an action becomes moot if the controversy is
no longer live, because an event occurs that precludes the court
from ordering effective relief). The law is clear that a claim is
moot if it can be shown that the court cannot even "theoretically
grant" relief. Vieux Carre, 948 F.2d at 1446; see also Harris, 151
F.3d at 190 (defining theoretical as giving the plaintiff "the benefit
of the doubt as to whether certain relief requested would in fact
ease or correct the alleged wrong").
In this case, however, injunctive relief is meaningful since the
event sought to be enjoined has not even begun. MMC is prepar-
ing for the fourth stage of mining but will not begin removing
overburden for an unspecified period of time. (R. 4). Since the
court may grant an injuction to prevent any further unpermitted
dumping by MMC and keep additional overburden rock out of
Lustra Creek, meaningful relief is available, and the case should
not be found moot. See Bayou Liberty Ass'n, 217 F.3d at 398 (hold-
ing that because completion of construction of a retail complex
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foreclosed any meaningful relief that would flow from granting
plaintiffs request, the action had become moot).
D. This case should not be found moot since it is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."
A classic exception to the mootness doctrine exists for dis-
putes which are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Sierra
Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997). The excep-
tion applies if (1) there is a reasonable expectation that the com-
plaining party will be subject to the same action again; and (2) the
challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior
to its cessation or expiration. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17
(1998). This case fits well within the exception and should not be
rendered moot.
First, there is a reasonable expectation that MMC will place
more overburden in Lustra Creek. See Mo. Coalition for the Env't
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 866 F.2d 1025, 1029-30
(8th Cir. 1989) (holding that conflict over a wetlands fill permit for
construction of a stadium fit within the mootness exception, even
though the team for which the stadium was intended had moved
to another state; county still owns the proposed stadium site and
is seeking an expansion franchise to locate there). Between Janu-
ary 1980 and January 1998, MMC stripped overburden rock from
the slope of Magic Mountain in three phases and placed it at the
base of the slope, covering Lustra Creek for half a mile. (R. 4).
MMC continues to operate the mine, and a fourth phase is
planned in which it will be necessary to remove more overburden.
(Id.) Although MMC has not decided where to place the overbur-
den, they admit that dumping it in the Creek remains the easiest
and cheapest means of disposal. (Id.) While the CAO between
Rocky Mountain and MMC prohibits the dumping of overburden
into the Creek without a permit, MMC has already violated the
requirements of that order. (Id.)
Second, the unpermitting dumping by MMC is too short in
duration to be fully litigated prior to its completion. The court be-
low found that "if MMC resumes filling the Creek, its conduct will
last long enough for the plaintiffs to seek meaningful injunctive
relief' since past operations "lasted for months at a time and there
is no evidence that it would be a shorter operation in the future."
(R. 9). However, this mischaracterizes the relief that the state is
seeking. Rocky Mountain is not asking to enjoin MMC from com-
pleting its fourth phase of mining but instead to enforce its order
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against any further unpermitted dumping by MMC. It would be
impossible for Rocky Mountain to seek out any meaningful injunc-
tive relief or fully litigate the case before MMC resumes dumping
overburden without a permit, unless there was continuous moni-
toring of Magic Mountain and MMC's operations. Even a tempo-
rary restraining order may not be available before additional
overburden is added to the Creek, given MMC's remote location
and the uncertainty surrounding the fourth phase of mining it has
planned. Effective monitoring and enforcement of the CAO
against MMC may only be accomplished by a finding that this
case is not moot and allowing Rocky Mountain to enforce its order
against MMC through the courts.
E. Holding this case to be moot would frustrate the
purpose of both the CWA and RMSWA.
A finding of mootness would frustrate the purpose of both the
CWA and RMSWA. The CWA was enacted to "restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters" by prohibiting the unpermitted discharge of pollutants.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a). Similarly, the RMSWA establishes
a comprehensive scheme for regulating the disposal of solid waste
by forbidding any discharges other than to permitted landfills. (R.
5). In addition, one of RMSWA's guiding principles is the protec-
tion of water quality. (R. 7). Companies in violation of these laws
would become complacent knowing that future sanctions could be
avoided simply by ceasing their illegal conduct by the time the
suit comes to trial. See United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343
U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (finding that the mootness doctrine must pro-
tect plaintiffs from those who seek to evade sanctions "by predict-
able protestations of repentance and reform"); Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1137 (11th Cir.
1990). More importantly, companies going out of business for
commercial reasons would have little incentive to comply with the
law if monetary penalties could be avoided once the company dis-
solves. As long as MMC operates, it must know that it will be
liable under federal and state law, even on the last day of opera-
tion. See Reich v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 102 F.3d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 1997).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Rocky Mountain urges that the de-
cision of the United States District Court for the District of Rocky
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Mountain to preclude FOL's citizen suit under the diligent prose-
cution bars of the Clean Water Act and the doctrine of res judicata
be affirmed. However, Rocky Mountain urges this Court to re-
verse the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment on
the issues of continuing violation and mootness.
Respectfully Submitted,
Counsel for Appellant,
State of Rocky Mountain
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APPEN]IX
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994):
Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological
integrity of Nation's waters; national goals for achievement of
objective
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In or-
der to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent
with the provisions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal
of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on
the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be
provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment man-
agement planning processes be developed and implemented to as-
sure adequate control of sources of pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstra-
tion effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of
the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an
expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be
met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994):
Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of States
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land
and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the
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exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is the policy of Con-
gress that the States manage the construction grant program
under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sec-
tions 1342 and 1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Con-
gress to support and aid research relating to the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal
technical services and financial aid to State and interstate agen-
cies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduc-
tion, and elimination of pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994):
Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollu-
tant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1994):
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condi-
tion or limitation which implements section 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title in a permit issued by a State
under an approved permit program under section 1342 or 1344 of
this title, he shall proceed under his authority in paragraph (3) of
this subsection or he shall notify the person in alleged violation
and such State of such finding. If beyond the thirtieth day after
the Administrator's notification the State has not commenced ap-
propriate enforcement action, the Administrator shall issue an or-
der requiring such person to comply with such condition or
limitation or shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (1994):
(6) Effect of order
(A) Limitation on actions under other sections
Action taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case
may be, under this subsection shall not affect or limit the Admin-
istrator's or Secretary's authority to enforce any provision of this
chapter; except that any violation-
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the Secretary has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under this
subsection,
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(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this sub-
section, or
(iii) for which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the State has
issued a final order not subject to further judicial review and the
violator has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law, as the case may be,
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under subsection
(d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of
this title.
(B) Applicability of limitation with respect to citizen suits
The limitations contained in subparagraph (A) on civil penalty ac-
tions under section 1365 of this title shall not apply with respect
to any violation for which-
(i) a civil action under section 1365(a)(1) of this title has been filed
prior to commencement of an action under this subsection, or
(ii) notice of an alleged violation of section 1365(a)(1) of this title
has been given in accordance with section 1365(b)(1)(A) of this ti-
tle prior to commencement of an action under this subsection and
an action under section 1365(a)(1) of this title with respect to such
alleged violation is filed before the 120th day after the date on
which such notice is given.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994):
State permit programs
At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines required by
subsection (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Governor of each
State desiring to administer its own permit program for dis-
charges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit
to the Administrator a full and complete description of the pro-
gram it proposes to establish and administer under State law or
under an interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit
a statement from the attorney general (or the attorney for those
State water pollution control agencies which have independent le-
gal counsel), or from the chief legal officer in the case of an inter-
state agency, that the laws of such State, or the interstate
compact, as the case may be, provide adequate authority to carry
out the described program. The Administrator shall approve each
such submitted program unless he determines that adequate au-
thority does not exist:
(1) To issue permits which-
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(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable require-
ments of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title;
(B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and
(C) can be terminated or modified for cause including, but not lim-
ited to, the following:
(i) violation of any condition of the permit;
(ii) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose
fully all relevant facts;
(iii) change in any condition that requires either a temporary or
permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted discharge;
(D) control the disposal of pollutants into wells;
(2)(A) To issue permits which apply, and insure compliance with,
all applicable requirements of section 1318 of this title; or
(B) To inspect, monitor, enter, and require reports to at least the
same extent as required in section 1318 of this title;
(3) To insure that the public, and any other State the waters of
which may be affected, receive notice of each application for a per-
mit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a rul-
ing on each such application;
(4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of each appli-
cation (including a copy thereof) for a permit;
(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting State),
whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may
submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the
Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any
part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the per-
mitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected
State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept
such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing;
(6) To insure that no permit will be issued if, in the judgment of
the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of Engineers,
after consultation with the Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and navigation of any of
the navigable waters would be substantially impaired thereby;
(7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program, in-
cluding civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of
enforcement;
(8) To insure that any permit for a discharge from a publicly
owned treatment works includes conditions to require the identifi-
cation in terms of character and volume of pollutants of any signif-
icant source introducing pollutants subject to pretreatment
standards under section 1317(b) of this title into such works and a
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program to assure compliance with such pretreatment standards
by each such source, in addition to adequate notice to the permit-
ting agency of (A) new introductions into such works of pollutants
from any source which would be a new source as defined in section
1316 of this title if such source were discharging pollutants, (B)
new introductions of pollutants into such works from a source
which would be subject to section 1311 of this title if it were dis-
charging such pollutants, or (C) a substantial change in volume or
character of pollutants being introduced into such works by a
source introducing pollutants into such works at the time of issu-
ance of the permit. Such notice shall include information on the
quality and quantity of effluent to be introduced into such treat-
ment works and any anticipated impact of such change in the
quantity or quality of effluent to be discharged from such publicly
owned treatment works; and
(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly owned treat-
ment works will comply with sections 1284(b), 1317, and 1318 of
this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994):
(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for
public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into
the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the
fifteenth day after the date an applicant submits all the informa-
tion required to complete an application for a permit under this
subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required by this
subsection.
(b) Specification for disposal sites
Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such disposal site
shall be specified for each such permit by the Secretary (1)
through the application of guidelines developed by the Adminis-
trator, in conjunction with the Secretary, which guidelines shall
be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the
territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under section
1343(c) of this title, and (2) in any case where such guidelines
under clause (1) alone would prohibit the specification of a site,
through the application additionally of the economic impact of the
site on navigation and anchorage.
(c) Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal sites
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (in-
cluding the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a
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disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of
any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of
specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after no-
tice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of
such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse
effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery ar-
eas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recrea-
tional areas. Before making such determination, the
Administrator shall consult with the Secretary. The Administra-
tor shall set forth in writing and make public his findings and his
reasons for making any determination under this subsection.
(d) "Secretary" defined
The term "Secretary" as used in this section means the Secretary
of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers.
(e) General permits on State, regional, or nationwide basis
(1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of
dredged or fill material under this section, the Secretary may, af-
ter notice and opportunity for public hearing, issue general per-
mits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis for any category of
activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the
Secretary determines that the activities in such category are simi-
lar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental ef-
fects when performed separately, and will have only minimal
cumulative adverse effect on the environment. Any general permit
issued under this subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines
described in subsection (b)(1) of this section, and (B) set forth the
requirements and standards which shall apply to any activity au-
thorized by such general permit.
(2) No general permit issued under this subsection shall be for a
period of more than five years after the date of its issuance and
such general permit may be revoked or modified by the Secretary
if, after opportunity for public hearing, the Secretary determines
that the activities authorized by such general permit have an ad-
verse impact on the environment or such activities are more ap-
propriately authorized by individual permits.
() Non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill material
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material-
(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities
such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting
for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil
and water conservation practices;
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(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including emergency recon-
struction of recently damaged parts, of currently serviceable
structures such as dikes, dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwa-
ters, causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and trans-
portation structures;
(C) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock
ponds or irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage
ditches;
(D) for the purpose of construction of temporary sedimentation ba-
sins on a construction site which does not include placement of fill
material into the navigable waters;
(E) for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads
or forest roads, or temporary roads for moving mining equipment,
where such roads are constructed and maintained, in accordance
with best management practices, to assure that flow and circula-
tion patterns and chemical and biological characteristics of the
navigable waters are not impaired, that. the reach of the navigable
waters is not reduced, and that any adverse effect on the aquatic
environment will be otherwise minimized;
(F) resulting from any activity with respect to which a State has
an approved program under section 1288(b)(4) of this title which
meets the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such
section,
is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this
section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of this title (except for effluent
standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this title).
(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an
area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previ-
ously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters
may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be
required to have a permit under this section.
(g) State administration
(1) The Governor of any State desiring to administer its own indi-
vidual and general permit program for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters (other than those waters
which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural
condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport
interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high
water mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high water mark, or
mean higher high water mark on the west coast, including wet-
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lands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction may submit to the
Administrator a full and complete description of the program it
proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an
interstate compact. In addition, such State shall submit a state-
ment from the attorney general (or the attorney for those State
agencies which have independent legal counsel), or from the chief
legal officer in the case of an interstate agency, that the laws of
such State, or the interstate compact, as the case may be, provide
adequate authority to carry out the described program.
(2) Not later than the tenth day after the date of the receipt of the
program and statement submitted by any State under paragraph
(1) of this subsection, the Administrator shall provide copies of
such program and statement to the Secretary and the Secretary of
the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service.
(3) Not later than the ninetieth day after the date of the receipt by
the Administrator of the program and statement submitted by any
State, under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Secretary and
the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, shall submit any com-
ments with respect to such program and statement to the Admin-
istrator in writing.
(h) Determination of State's authority to issue permits under
State program; approval; notification; transfers to State program
(1) Not later than the one-hundred-twentieth day after the date of
the receipt by the Administrator of a program and statement sub-
mitted by any State under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
Administrator shall determine, taking into account any comments
submitted by the Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, act-
ing through the Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, whether such
State has the following authority with respect to the issuance of
permits pursuant to such program:
(A) To issue permits which-
(i) apply, and assure compliance with, any applicable require-
ments of this section, including, but not limited to, the guidelines
established under subsection (b)(1) of this section, and sections
1317 and 1343 of this title;
(ii) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; and
(iii) can be terminated or modified for cause including, but not lim-
ited to, the following:
(I) violation of any condition of the permit;
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(II) obtaining a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose
fully all relevant facts;
(III) change in any condition that requires either a temporary or
permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted discharge.
(B) To issue permits which apply, and assure compliance with, all
applicable requirements of section 1318 of this title, or to inspect,
monitor, enter, and require reports to at least the same extent as
required in section 1318 of this title.
(C) To assure that the public, and any other State the waters of
which may be affected, receive notice of each application for a per-
mit and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a rul-
ing on each such application.
(D) To assure that the Administrator receives notice of each appli-
cation (including a copy thereof) for a permit.
(E) To assure that any State (other than the permitting State),
whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may
submit written recommendations to the permitting State (and the
Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any
part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the per-
mitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected
State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept
such recommendations together with its reasons for so doing.
(F) To assure that no permit will be issued if, in the judgment of
the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of the depart-
ment in which the Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and navi-
gation of any of the navigable waters would be substantially
impaired thereby.
(G) To abate violations of the permit or the permit program, in-
cluding civil and criminal penalties and other ways and means of
enforcement.
(H) To assure continued coordination with Federal and Federal-
State water- related planning and review processes.
(2) If, with respect to a State program submitted under subsection
(g)(1) of this section, the Administrator determines that such
State-
(A) has the authority set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the Administrator shall approve the program and so notify (i) such
State and (ii) the Secretary, who upon subsequent notification
from such State that it is administering such program, shall sus-
pend the issuance of permits under subsections (a) and (e) of this
section for activities with respect to which a permit may be issued
pursuant to such State program; or
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(B) does not have the authority set forth in paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the Administrator shall so notify such State, which no-
tification shall also describe the revisions or modifications neces-
sary so that such State may resubmit such program for a
determination by the Administrator under this subsection.
(3) If the Administrator fails to make a determination with respect
to any program submitted by a State under subsection (g)(1) of
this section within one-hundred-twenty days after the date of the
receipt of such program, such program shall be deemed approved
pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection and the Adminis-
trator shall so notify such State and the Secretary who, upon sub-
sequent notification from such State that it is administering such
program, shall suspend the issuance of permits under subsection
(a) and (e) of this section for activities with respect to which a per-
mit may be issued by such State.
(4) After the Secretary receives notification from the Administra-
tor under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection that a State per-
mit program has been approved, the Secretary shall transfer any
applications for permits pending before the Secretary for activities
with respect to which a permit may be issued pursuant to such
State program to such State for appropriate action.
(5) Upon notification from a State with a permit program ap-
proved under this subsection that such State intends to adminis-
ter and enforce the terms and conditions of a general permit
issued by the Secretary under subsection (e) of this section with
respect to activities in such State to which such general permit
applies, the Secretary shall suspend the administration and en-
forcement of such general permit with respect to such activities.
(i) Withdrawal of approval
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that
a State is not administering a program approved under subsection
(h)(2)(A) of this section, in accordance with this section, including,
but not limited to, the guidelines established under subsection
(b)(1) of this section, the Administrator shall so notify the State,
and, if appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasona-
ble time, not to exceed ninety days after the date of the receipt of
such notification, the Administrator shall (1) withdraw approval
of such program until the Administrator determines such correc-
tive action has been taken, and (2) notify the Secretary that the
Secretary shall resume the program for the issuance of permits
under subsections (a) and (e) of this section for activities with re-
spect to which the State was issuing permits and that such au-
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thority of the Secretary shall continue in effect until such time as
the Administrator makes the determination described in clause
(1) of this subsection and such State again has an approved
program.
(j) Copies of applications for State permits and proposed general
permits to be transmitted to Administrator
Each State which is administering a permit program pursuant to
this section shall transmit to the Administrator (1) a copy of each
permit application received by such State and provide notice to
the Administrator of every action related to the consideration of
such permit application, including each permit proposed to be is-
sued by such State, and (2) a copy of each proposed general permit
which such State intends to issue. Not later than the tenth day
after the date of the receipt of such permit application or such pro-
posed general permit, the Administrator shall provide copies of
such permit application or such proposed general permit to the
Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Di-
rector of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. If the Ad-
ministrator intends to provide written comments to such State
with respect to such permit application or such proposed general
permit, he shall so notify such State not later than the thirtieth
day after the date of the receipt of such application or such pro-
posed general permit and provide such written comments to such
State, after consideration of any comments made in writing with
respect to such application or such proposed general permit by the
Secretary and the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Di-
rector of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, not later
than the ninetieth day after the date of such receipt. If such State
is so notified by the Administrator, it shall not issue the proposed
permit until after the receipt of such comments from the Adminis-
trator, or after such ninetieth day, whichever first occurs. Such
State shall not issue such proposed permit after such ninetieth
day if it has received such written comments in which the Admin-
istrator objects (A) to the issuance of such proposed permit and
such proposed permit is one that has been submitted to the Ad-
ministrator pursuant to subsection (h)(1)(E) of this section, or (B)
to the issuance of such proposed permit as being outside the re-
quirements of this section, including, but not limited to, the guide-
lines developed under subsection (b)(1) of this section unless it
modifies such proposed permit in accordance with such comments.
Whenever the Administrator objects to the issuance of a permit
under the preceding sentence such written objection shall contain
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a statement of the reasons for such objection and the conditions
which such permit would include if it were issued by the Adminis-
trator. In any case where the Administrator objects to the issu-
ance of a permit, on request of the State, a public hearing shall be
held by the Administrator on such objection. If the State does not
resubmit such permit revised to meet such objection within 30
days after completion of the hearing or, if no hearing is requested
within 90 days after the date of such objection, the Secretary may
issue the permit pursuant to subsection (a) or (e) of this section, as
the case may be, for such source in accordance with the guidelines
and requirements of this chapter.
(k) Waiver
In accordance with guidelines promulgated pursuant to subsec-
tion (i)(2) of section 1314 of this title, the Administrator is author-
ized to waive the requirements of subsection (j) of this section at
the time of the approval of a program pursuant to subsection
(h)(2)(A) of this section for any category (including any class, type,
or size within such category) of discharge within the State submit-
ting such program.
(1) Categories of discharges not subject to requirements
The Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing cat-
egories of discharges which he determines shall not be subject to
the requirements of subsection (j) of this section in any State with
a program approved pursuant to subsection (h)(2)(A) of this sec-
tion. The Administrator may distinguish among classes, types,
and sizes within any category of discharges.
(m) Comments on permit applications or proposed general permits
by Secretary of the Interior acting through Director of United
States Fish and Wildlife Service
Not later than the ninetieth day after the date on which the Secre-
tary notifies the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Di-
rector of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service that (1) an
application for a permit under subsection (a) of this section has
been received by the Secretary, or (2) the Secretary proposes to
issue a general permit under subsection (e) of this section, the Sec-
retary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, shall submit any comments with
respect to such application or such proposed general permit in
writing to the Secretary.
(n) Enforcement authority not limited
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of
the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this
title.
(o ) Public availability of permits and permit applications
A copy of each permit application and each permit issued under
this section shall be available to the public. Such permit applica-
tion or portion thereof, shall further be available on request for
the purpose of reproduction.
(p) Compliance
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section, includ-
ing any activity carried out pursuant to a general permit issued
under this section, shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of
sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1317, and
1343 of this title.
(q) Minimization of duplication, needless paperwork, and delays
in issuance; agreements
Not later than the one-hundred-eightieth day after December 27,
1977, the Secretary shall enter into agreements with the Adminis-
trator, the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Com-
merce, Interior, and Transportation, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal agencies to minimize, to the maximum extent
practicable, duplication, needless paperwork, and delays in the is-
suance of permits under this section. Such agreements shall be
developed to assure that, to the maximum extent practicable, a
decision with respect to an application for a permit under subsec-
tion (a) of this section will be made not later than the ninetieth
day after the date the notice for such application is published
under subsection (a) of this section.
(r) Federal projects specifically authorized by Congress
The discharge of dredged or fill material as part of the construc-
tion of a Federal project specifically authorized by Congress,
whether prior to or on or after December 27, 1977, is not prohib-
ited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section, or a
State program approved under this section, or section 1311(a) or
1342 of this title (except for effluent standards or prohibitions
under section 1317 of this title), if information on the effects of
such discharge, including consideration of the guidelines devel-
oped under subsection (b)(1) of this section, is included in an envi-
ronmental impact statement for such project pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et
seq.] and such environmental impact statement has been submit-
ted to Congress before the actual discharge of dredged or fill mate-
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rial in connection with the construction of such project and prior
to either authorization of such project or an appropriation of funds
for such construction.
(s) Violation of permits
(1) Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the
Secretary finds that any person is in violation of any condition or
limitation set forth in a permit issued by the Secretary under this
section, the Secretary shall issue an order requiring such person
to comply with such condition or limitation, or the Secretary shall
bring a civil action in accordance with paragraph (3) of this
subsection.
(2) A copy of any order issued under this subsection shall be sent
immediately by the Secretary to the State in which the violation
occurs and other affected States. Any order issued under this sub-
section shall be by personal service and shall state with reasona-
ble specificity the nature of the violation, specify a time for
compliance, not to exceed thirty days, which the Secretary deter-
mines is reasonable, taking into account the seriousness of the vi-
olation and any good faith efforts to comply with applicable
requirements. In any case in which an order under this subsection
is issued to a corporation, a copy of such order shall be served on
any appropriate corporate officers.
(3) The Secretary is authorized to commence a civil action for ap-
propriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction
for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance
order under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Any action under
this paragraph may be brought in the district court of the United
States for the district in which the defendant is located or resides
or is doing business, and such court shall have jurisdiction to re-
strain such violation and to require compliance. Notice of the com-
mencement of such acton shall be given immediately to the
appropriate State.
(4) Any person who violates any condition or limitation in a permit
issued by the Secretary under this section, and any person who
violates any order issued by the Secretary under paragraph (1) of
this subsection, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$25,000 per day for each violation. In determining the amount of a
civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the viola-
tion or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the
violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to
comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of
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the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may
require.
(5) Redesignated (4)
(t) Navigable waters within State jurisdiction
Nothing in this section shall preclude or deny the right of any
State or interstate agency to control the discharge of dredged or
fill material in any portion of the navigable waters within the ju-
risdiction of such State, including any activity of any Federal
agency, and each such agency shall comply with such State or in-
terstate requirements both substantive and procedural to control
the discharge of dredged or fill material to the same extent that
any person is subject to such requirements. This section shall not
be construed as affecting or impairing the authority of the Secre-
tary to maintain navigation.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994):
(6) The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, inciner-
ator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemi-
cal wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.
This term does not mean (A) "sewage from vessels or a discharge
incidental to the normal operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces"
within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas,
or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate produc-
tion of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas
production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to fa-
cilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by author-
ity of the State in which the well is located, and if such State
determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the
degradation of ground or surface water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994):
(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994):
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of
pollutants" each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navi-
gable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollu-
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tant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994):
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent per-
mitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is al-
leged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or
a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to
order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994):
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which
the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the
standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limita-
tion, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,
except that such action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a
violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this title. Notice under
this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administra-
tor shall prescribe by regulation.
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42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994):
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any per-
son may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, con-
dition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effec-
tive pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any
action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of Colum-
bia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to en-
force the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain
any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dispo-
sal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B),
to order such person to take such other action as may be neces-
sary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the act or
duty referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply
any appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of
this title.
2001] 343
57
344 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
33 C.F.R. 323.2(e) (2000):
The term "fill material" means any material used for the primary
purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing
the bottom elevation of a waterbody. The term does not include
any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of
waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of the Clean
Water Act. See § 323.3(c) concerning the regulation of the place-
ment of pilings in waters of the United States.
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